




Echoworx Root CA2

Certificate Policy and  
Certification Practices Statement



**V e r s i o n   1 . 7**

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## Revision History

Version	Date	Amendment Details	Author	Approver
0.1	2005-09-30	Initial Draft	M.J. Brown	
0.2	2005-10-02	Added sections for <i>Key Life Cycle Management</i> and <i>CA Environmental Controls</i> .	M.J. Brown	
0.3	2005-10-05	Minor changes only.	M.J. Brown	
1.0	2005-10-06	Marked final.	M.J. Brown	
1.1	2005-10-26	Slight changes to certificate profiles for CDP and CPS URLs and correct ordering of DN attributes. Added <i>References</i> section. Added appendix with root certificate in PEM and text formats with fingerprints. Removed appendix with extraneous OIDs.	M.J. Brown	
1.2	2008-08-10	Added version control and Correction of various URL	Alex Loo	Greg Aligiannis
1.3	2009-06-16	Update section 2.17 "Acceptable uses and limits on reliance" Update section 3.2.3 Subordinate CA key archival Update section 3.2.4 Subordinate CA key destruction Update section 4.11 Certificate status Updated section 5.7 Event logging	Echoworx	Greg Aligiannis
1.4	2009-08-26	Added section 5.5 Security management Added section 5.6 Asset classification and management Added section 5.7 Personnel security Updated section 5.9 with approximate distance between CA primary and recovery site and actual and suspected CA private key compromise	Echoworx	Greg Aligiannis
1.5	Feb. 1, 2012	Update section 3.2.1 1024 to 2048	Alex loo	Greg Aligiannis
1.6	August 7, 2013	Update section 3.1.3, 3.1.4 for CA Key Archive and CA Key destruction.	Alex Loo	Greg Aligiannis
1.7	March 30, 2015	Update doc to reflect subca to support sha2 section 4.12.2	Alex Loo	Greg Aligiannis

# 1 Introduction

This document constitutes the overarching *Certificate Policy (CP)* and *Certification Practices Statement (CPS)* for the **Echoworx Root CA2** certification authority. The purpose of this document is to publicly disclose to subscribers and relying parties the business policies and practices under which this certification authority is operated.

This document has been prepared in accordance with recommended best practices defined by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc. and Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants in the document entitled *AICPA/CICA WebTrust<sup>SM/TM</sup> Program for Certification Authorities, version 1.0* dated 2000/08/25 [WebTrust].

## 2 General practices

This section addresses general business practices with respect to the operation of this root CA, including the identification of relevant policies; the target community of interest and applicability of certificates; contact information; limits of liability; financial responsibilities; legal considerations; fees; requirements and obligations of relevant parties; and acceptable usage of certificates and limitations of reliance thereupon.

### 2.1 Policy authority

The governing body of this PKI is the Echoworx Policy Authority (PA), who is responsible for the selection/definition of the certificate policy (CP) for the organization, development and management of the certification practices statement (CPS) and the correct day to day operation of the PKI.

### 2.2 Policy identification

The Echoworx Root CA2 Certification Authority operates as a **Type 1** root CA (see table below) that may issue X.509 certificates to subordinate CA entities for issuing End-entity certificates.

<b>Certificate Class</b>	<b>Network Protection</b>	<b>System Protection</b>	<b>Private Key Protection</b>
<b>Type '1' Root CA</b>	<b>Dedicated system</b>  <b>Always off-line</b>	<b>High security controls, two-factor user authentication, intrusion detection &amp; audit logging</b>	<b>HSM</b> Stored in vault when not used Multi-party access controls Audited key ceremonies
<b>Type '2' Root CA</b>	<b>Multi-purpose workstation</b>  <b>Disconnected as needed for CA operations</b>	<b>High security controls</b>  LiveCD OS used as needed w/ temporary storage (securely wiped)	<b>Removable Media</b> Stored in vault when not used Multi-party access controls Audited key ceremonies

Table 1: Root CA certificate classes

Subordinate (or Intermediate) Issuing CA(s) shall be denoted as Class A, B, or C depending upon the environmental controls for the operational security regime (as described in the table below) and operated in accordance with policies and practices commensurate therewith.

<b>Certificate Class</b>	<b>Network Protection</b>	<b>System Protection</b>	<b>Private Key Protection</b>
<b>Class 'A' Subordinate CA</b>	<b>Secure network zone w/ layer-1 separation, highly restricted</b>	<b>Medium - High security controls, two-factor user</b>	<b>HSM</b> On-line signing engine

<b>Certificate Class</b>	<b>Network Protection</b>	<b>System Protection</b>	<b>Private Key Protection</b>
	<b>access controls &amp; intrusion monitoring</b>	<b>authentication, intrusion detection, audit logging, remote monitoring &amp; site surveillance</b>	
<b>Class 'B' Subordinate CA</b>	<b>Private network zone w/ layer-1 separation, restricted access controls &amp; intrusion detection</b>	<b>High security controls, intrusion detection, audit logging, remote monitoring &amp; site surveillance</b>	<b>Encrypted on Fixed Disk</b> Clear key in system memory for on-line signing operations
<b>Class 'C' Subordinate CA</b>	<b>Internal network w/ firewall perimeter access controls</b>	<b>Medium security controls, intrusion detection &amp; audit logging</b>	<b>Encrypted on Fixed Disk</b> Clear key in system memory for on-line signing operations

Table 2: Subordinate CA Certificate Classes

### 2.2.1 Policy object identifiers (OIDs)

Certificate policy identifiers for certificates issued (directly) by this Root CA are given in the table (below). Echoworx Corporation was assigned the OID prefix **1.3.6.1.4.1.15505** by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) [<http://www.iana.org/>], whose registry is now managed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) [<http://www.icann.org/>].

<b>OID Value</b>	<b>OID Name</b>
<b>Echoworx Object identifiers</b>	
<b>1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10</b>	(echoworx.policy)
<b>Certificate Policy identifiers</b>	
1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10.1	(policy.certificatePolicy)
1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10.1.1	(certificatePolicy.testPurposesOnly)
1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10.1.2	(certificatePolicy.reserved)
<b>Root CA Certificate Policy identifiers</b>	
1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10.1.3	(certificatePolicy.rootCA)
1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10.1.3.1	(rootCA.type1)
1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10.1.3.2	(rootCA.type2)
<b>Subordinate CA Certificate Policy identifiers</b>	
1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10.1.4	(certificatePolicy.subordinateCA)
1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10.1.4.1	(subordinateCA.classA)
1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10.1.4.1.1	(classB.escrowAllowed)
1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10.1.4.2	(subordinateCA.classC)
1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10.1.4.2.1	(classA.escrowAllowed)
1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10.1.4.3	(subordinateCA.classB)
1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10.1.4.3.1	(classC.escrowAllowed)

Table 3: Certificate Policy Object Identifiers (OIDs)



## **2.3 Community and applicability**

This document defines the policies and practices under which Echoworx Corporation (hereafter 'Echoworx') operates a Certification Authority (CA) and contingent upon which it issues Public Key Certificate credentials to authorized subordinate Certification Authority (Subordinate CA) entities for the issuance thereby of end-entity certificates to users of Echoworx-enabled applications, such as its Echoworx Secure Mail (ESM) product, operated as a subscription service offering pursuant to agreements in place between these parties and any others in whose name(s) the service may be offered.

This CA is established to provide certification services for a variety of external customers. The CA makes use of customer designated personnel to act as Registration Authority (RA) agents to verify the identity of subscribers, in accordance with the indicated certificate policy. Subscribers include all parties who contract with the CA and/or its customers on whose behalf digital certificates are issued. All parties who may rely upon the certificates issued by the CA are considered relying parties.

This certificate policy and certification practices statement (CP/CPS) is applicable to all certificates issued by this root CA. Subordinate CA(s) and/or end-entity certificates may have specific associated CP and/or CPS documents that supplement the information provided herein. The policies and practices described in this CP/CPS apply to the issuance and use of certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) for users within the community of subject certificate entities and relying parties.

## **2.4 Contact information**

This Certification Authority is owned and operated by Echoworx Corporation. General inquiries and customer requests may be addressed to:

Echoworx Corporation  
Attn: Director of Certification Services  
4101 Yonge Street, Suite 708  
Toronto, Ontario, Canada  
M2P 1N6

Email: [ca-info@echoworx.com](mailto:ca-info@echoworx.com)  
Web: <http://www.echoworx.com>

Tel: 416-226-8600  
Fax: 416-226-8629

## **2.5 Limits of liability (No Warranty)**

Echoworx asserts no control over how members of the community protect their own credentials. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS Echoworx RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES TO A RELYING PARTY OF MAKING USE OF CREDENTIALS Echoworx ISSUES. Echoworx OFFERS NO WARRANTY OF ANY KIND AND DISCLAIMS ANY WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Echoworx CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES OF ANY KIND WHETHER DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL EVEN IF Echoworx HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.

Notwithstanding, except as expressly provided otherwise in this CP/CPS, applicable CP, or by statute or

regulation, the CA's total liability per breach of any express warranties made under this CP/CPS and/or applicable CP is limited to direct damages having a maximum dollar amount (that is, a liability cap) of one dollar (\$1.00). The liability cap set forth in this CP/CPS or applicable CP shall be the same regardless of the number of digital signatures, transactions, or claims related to such certificate. Additionally, in the event the liability cap is exceeded, the available liability cap shall be apportioned first to the earliest claims to achieve final dispute resolution, unless otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction. In no event shall the CA be obligated to pay more than the aggregate liability cap for each certificate, regardless of the method of apportionment among claimants to the amount of the liability cap.

## ***2.6 Financial responsibility***

By applying for and being issued certificates, or otherwise relying upon such certificates, subscribers and relying parties agree to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless the CA, and its personnel, organizations, entities, subcontractors, suppliers, vendors, representatives, and agents from any errors, omissions, acts, failures to act, or negligence resulting in liability, losses, damages, suits, or expenses of any kind, due to or otherwise proximately caused by the use or publication of a certificate that arises from the subscriber's failure to provide the CA with current, accurate, and complete information at the time of certificate application or the subscriber's errors, omissions, acts, failures to act, and negligence.

This CA and its registration authorities (RAs) are not the agents, fiduciaries, trustees, or other representatives of subscribers or relying parties.

## ***2.7 Interpretation and enforcement***

### **2.7.1 Governing law**

The laws of the province of Ontario in Canada shall govern the enforceability and construction of this CP/CPS document to ensure uniform procedures and interpretation for all users.

### **2.7.2 Severability, survival, merger, notice**

Severance or merger may result in changes to the scope, management, and/or operations of this CA. In such an event, this CP/CPS may require modification as well. Changes to the operations will occur consistently with the CA's disclosed CP/CPS management processes.

### **2.7.3 Dispute resolution procedures**

In the event of any dispute involving the services or provisions covered by this CP/CPS, the aggrieved party shall first notify the CA and all other relevant parties regarding the dispute. The CA will involve the appropriate personnel to resolve the dispute.

## ***2.8 Fees***

The CA may charge fees for their use of the CA's services on a negotiated per-user subscription basis in accordance with contracts between the CA and an application service provider on whose behalf end-entity certificates are issued to licensed users (subscribers) of Echoworx application software. Such fees are collected from the application service provider, not directly from the subscribing end-users. Additional fees may be levied for the setup, operation and maintenance of the issuing subordinate CA, subject to the terms and conditions of the contract between the CA and the application service provider.

## **2.9 Publication and repository requirements**

This root CA's certificate policy and certification practices statement (CP/CPS) (this document) shall be published at:

<http://www.echoworx.com/ca/root2/cps.pdf>

Upon issuance, all public key certificates and certificate distribution lists (CRLs) issued (directly) by this CA are published at:

<http://www.echoworx.com/ca/root2/>

Revoked certificates may be removed upon publication of the CRL.

All subscribers and relying parties have access to the CA's repository.

## **2.10 Compliance audit requirements**

An annual audit is performed by an independent external auditor to assess the adequacy of this CA's business practices disclosure and the effectiveness of the CA's controls over its CA operations.

Topics covered by the annual audit include the following:

- CA business practices disclosure
- Service integrity (including key and certificate life cycle management controls)
- CA environmental controls

Significant deficiencies identified during the compliance audit will result in a determination of actions to be taken. This determination is made by the auditor with input from CA management. The CA is responsible for seeing that corrective action is taken within 60 days. Should a severe deficiency be identified that might compromise the integrity of the CA, CA management considers, with input from the auditor, whether suspension of the CA's operation is warranted.

Compliance audit results are communicated to the board of directors of the CA, CA management, and the CA's policy authority, as well as others deemed appropriate by CA management.

## **2.11 Conditions of certificate applicability**

Certificates issued under the CA's certificate policy are limited to use in connection with Echoworx licensed application software. Certificates issued by the CA may not be used for any other purpose unless expressly permitted otherwise.

## **2.12 CA obligations**

This CA is obligated to:

- Conform its operations to this CP/CPS, as the same may from time to time be modified by amendments published in the CA repository
- Issue and publish certificates in a timely manner in accordance with the relevant certificate policy
- Revoke certificates issued by this CA, upon receipt of a valid request to revoke the certificate from a person authorized to request revocation

- Publish CRLs on a timely basis in accordance with the applicable certificate policy and with provisions described in [Section 4.9.Certificate revocation](#).
- Notify subscribers via e-mail (1) that certificates have been generated for them and (2) how the subscribers may retrieve the certificates
- In the event this CA is not successful in validating the subscriber's application in accordance with the requirements for that class of certificate this CA shall notify the subscriber that the application has been rejected
- Notify subscribers via e-mail that the subscriber's certificate has been revoked
- Notify other participants in the PKI of certificate issuance revocation through access to certificates and CRLs in the CA's repository

## **2.13 RA obligations**

The RAs (or this CA's RA function) are obligated to:

- Verify the accuracy and authenticity of the information provided by the subscriber at the time of application, in accordance with the relevant certificate policy.
- Validate and securely send a revocation request to this CA upon receipt of a request to revoke a certificate, in accordance with the relevant certificate policy.
- Verify the accuracy and authenticity of the information provided by the subscriber at the time of renewal or re-key, in accordance with the relevant certificate policy.

## **2.14 Repository obligations**

The CA's repository function is obligated to publish certificates and certificate revocation lists in a timely manner.

## **2.15 Subscriber obligations**

Subscribers are obligated to:

- Provide information to the CA that is accurate and complete to the best of the subscribers' knowledge and belief regarding information in their certificates and identification and authentication information and promptly notify the CA of any changes to this information.
- Safeguard their private key from compromise.
- Use certificates exclusively for legal purposes and in accordance with the relevant certificate policy and this CPS (or other CA business practices disclosure).
- Promptly request that the CA revoke a certificate if the subscriber has reason to believe there has been a compromise of their private key corresponding to the public key listed in the certificate.

## **2.16 Relying party obligations**

Relying parties are obligated to:

- Restrict reliance on certificates issued by the CA to the purposes for those certificates, in accordance with the relevant certificate policy and with this CP/CPS.
- Verify the status of certificates at the time of reliance.
- Agree to be bound by the provisions of limitations of liability as described in this CP/CPS upon reliance on a certificate issued by the CA.

## **2.17 Acceptable uses and limits on reliance**

Certificates issued under the CA's certificate policy are limited to use in connection with Echoworx licensed

application software. Certificates issued by the CA may not be used for any other purpose unless expressly permitted otherwise.

## **3 Key life cycle management**

This section addresses the management of this root CA's cryptographic keys throughout the operational life cycle of this root CA, including how the public and private keys are generated and/or re-generated (i.e., key changeover or re-keying); how the private key(s) are stored, protected and eventually destroyed; and how the public key(s) are distributed and archived.

### **3.1 Root CA key management**

#### **3.1.1 Root CA key-pair generation**

This root CA's signing key is 2048 bits in length. The private-/public-key pair is generated in a Luna CA3 hardware security module (HSM) token using the RSA algorithm with true random number generation (RNG) per Annex C of ANSI X9.17.

This root CA's private signing key material is generated, stored and used wholly within the Luna CA3 token; it is never exported for use in another device or onto any other media (except for being cloned onto an identical Luna CA3 token for backup purposes).

This root CA's private signing key shall only be used to sign only subordinate CA X.509 public key certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs).

The lifetime of the CA signing key-pair is twenty-five (25) years.

The Luna CA3 token is manufactured by SafeNet Inc., which through mergers acquired the assets of Chrysalis ITS, Inc, the original developer of the Luna product line. This HSM device is compliant with FIPS 140-2 Level 3 and has been validated according to the Common Criteria Evaluation Assessment Level 4+ (EAL 4+) for environments that require the highest levels of physical and operational security.

#### **3.1.2 Root CA private-key protection**

This root CA's private signing key is stored in a Luna CA3™ hardware security module (HSM) token. This HSM device is compliant with FIPS 140-2 Level 3 and has been validated according to the Common Criteria Evaluation Assessment Level 4+ (EAL 4+) for environments that require the highest levels of physical and operational security.

There is a separation of physical and logical access to this root CA's private signing key.

Multi-party controls ensure that at least two (2) individuals (one designated as a Security Officer and another designated as a Crypto Officer) provide dual control over physical access to the hardware modules at any time; m of n secret shares held by other, separate custodians (all executives of the CA operator, Echoworx, or duly appointed thereby) on removable media (i.e., Luna DataKeys™) are also required for logical access to the HSM management functions and activation of the private keys.

This root CA's private signing key is backed up only on hardware certified to FIPS 140-1 level 3 (Luna CA3 tokens) and is stored with multi-party controls enforced at all points of custody. These backup tokens are stored securely off-site in a secure safe-deposit box in the vault of two separate recognized financial institutions.

This root CA's private keys shall NOT be placed in escrow with an external third party.

### **3.1.3 Root CA key archival**

This root CA's expired and/or revoked CA public key certificates shall be archived. A backup copy on removable media shall be stored securely in an off-site vault.

Archived keys are accessed only where historical evidence requires validation of archive keys. Only authorized Trusted Personnel are permitted to obtain access to archived keys.

### **3.1.4 Root CA key destruction**

This root CA's private signing key shall be destroyed by re-initializing (zeroizing) all the Luna CA3 tokens upon which it is stored (i.e., primary HSM and backup tokens). Each HSM token shall be safeguarded as though it were still active until it can be physically destroyed.

The CA key destruction will not occur unless the business purpose or application has ceased to have value or legal obligations.

### **3.1.5 Root CA public key distribution**

Customers establishing an Echoworx application service shall be provided this root CA's public key in a self-signed certificate on a CDROM contained within the software installation kit.

This root CA's public key shall be delivered in a self-signed public key certificate included in Echoworx software application packages delivered to customers for distribution to subscribing end-users. The end-user software package shall be signed using Microsoft's Authenticode technology for which a code-signing key has been certified by a trusted third party.

This root CA's public key shall also be distributed in a self-signed public key certificate to leading providers of Internet software containing trusted key material, such as Microsoft's Internet Explorer and Mozilla Foundations' Firefox browsers.

### **3.1.6 Root CA key changeover**

The CA root signing private key has a lifetime of twenty-five (25) years and the corresponding public key certificate has a lifetime of twenty five (25) years. Upon the end of the private key's lifetime, a new root CA signing key pair may be generated and all subsequently issued certificates and CRLs are signed with the new private signing key. A corresponding new root CA public key certificate shall be securely provided to subscribers and relying parties.

## ***3.2 Subscriber key management***

For customers that subscribe to this root CA's managed key service for operating subordinate CAs the following key management practices shall apply.

### **3.2.1 Subordinate CA key generation**

The subordinate CA's signing key pair shall be at least 2048 bits in length, using the RSA algorithm.

The subordinate CA's signing key shall be hardware generated and stored in an HSM device is compliant with FIPS 140-2 Level 3 (e.g., Luna SA™ HSM appliance and tokens).

The subordinate CA's signing key shall be used to sign subordinate CA public key certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs).

The lifetime of the subordinate CA signing key pair shall not exceed ten (10) years.

### **3.2.2 Subordinate CA key storage, backup, recovery**

The subordinate CA's signing key shall be stored in an HSM device compliant with FIPS 140-2 Level 3.

There shall be a separation of physical and logical access to the subordinate CA's root private key.

Multi-party controls shall ensure that at least two (2) individuals (one designated as a Security Officer and another designated as a Crypto Officer) provide dual control over physical access to the hardware modules at any time; m of n secret shares held by other, separate custodians on removable media (e.g., Luna DataKeys) are also required for logical access to the HSM management functions and activation of the private keys.

The subordinate CA's private signing key is backed up only on hardware certified to FIPS 140-1 level 3 (e.g., Luna SA™ tokens) and is stored with multi-party controls enforced at all points of custody. These backup tokens shall be stored securely off-site in a secure safe-deposit box in the vault of a recognized financial institution.

Subordinate CA private keys shall NOT be placed in escrow with an external third party.

The subordinate CA's private signing key and expired (and revoked) CA public key certificates shall be archived.

### **3.2.3 Subordinate CA key archival**

The subordinate CA's expired and/or revoked public key certificates shall be archived. A backup copy on removable media shall be stored securely in an off-site vault.

### **3.2.4 Subordinate CA key destruction**

The subordinate CA's private signing key shall be destroyed by re-initializing (i.e., zeroizing) all the HSM devices upon which it is stored (i.e., primary HSM and backup tokens).



## 4 Certificate life cycle management

This section addresses the management of this root CA's cryptographic keys throughout the operational life cycle of this root CA, including how the public and private keys are generated and/or re-generated (i.e., key changeover or re-keying); how the private key(s) are stored, protected and eventually destroyed; and how the public key(s) are distributed and archived.

### 4.1 *Initial registration of Subordinate CA*

The CA has established a single naming hierarchy utilizing the X.500 Distinguished Name form.

In all cases, names of subject subordinate CA entities must be meaningful. Generally, the name by which an organization is commonly known to the CA should be used.

All subordinate CA subjects are unambiguously identified in the naming hierarchy.

This root CA issues certificates within a closed PKI. Trademarks and related naming issues will generally not apply to certificates issued within this space.

Possession of a private key is proved by a public key certificate applicant by providing check values as defined in the certificate policy.

If organizational identity is considered important based upon the certificate policy, the organization identity is verified using a method approved by the certificate policy.

In submitting a certificate application, at least the following information must be submitted to this root CA: subscriber's public key, subscriber's distinguished name, and other information required on the CA's certificate application form.

If required by the certificate policy, the CA verifies the authority of the subscriber to request a certificate by checking whether the subscriber is an employee of a particular organization or association through inquiry of the organization's HR department or the association's membership department.

The CA may verify the accuracy of the information included in the subscriber's certificate request through validation against a third-party database.

The CA shall check certificate requests for errors or omissions.

### 4.2 *Registration using an external RA*

The CA requires that external registration authorities (RAs) physically present themselves along with two forms of identification to an employee of the CA.

The CA authorizes external RAs upon successful identification and authentication, and approval of the external RA enrollment and certificate application forms.

External RAs are responsible for identification and authentication of subscribers and must secure their private signing keys used for signing certificate applications, securely forward certificate applications to the CA, and securely store any subscriber information collected.

The CA verifies the authenticity of certificate request submissions received from an external RA by validating the RA's digital signature on the submission.

### ***4.3 Certificate renewal***

The certificate renewal process is similar to an application for a new certificate. However, the subscriber needs to provide only information that has changed.

### ***4.4 Routine re-keying***

Authentication of the subordinate CA's identity as defined in this root CA's identification and authentication requirements for initial registration need not be repeated unless required by the applicable certificate policy. Subscribers will be limited to re-keying no more than twice before repeating the authentication process defined in identification and authentication requirements for initial registration.

### ***4.5 Re-keying after expiry or revocation***

For subordinate CAs whose certificates have been revoked or have expired, re-keying is permitted if the identification and authentication requirements for initial registration are repeated.

### ***4.6 Certificate issuance***

Certificates are issued to the subordinate CAs upon successful processing of the application and the acceptance of the certificates by the subscribers. Certificate format, validity period, extension field, and key usage extension field requirements are specified in accordance with this root CA's disclosed certificate profile.

### ***4.7 Certificate acceptance***

Once a certificate has been generated, it is maintained in a secure remote repository until it is retrieved by the subscriber. Upon retrieval of the certificate from the secure remote repository, the certificate status is updated to reflect its status as accepted and valid.

### ***4.8 Certificate distribution***

A single repository is operated for subscribers and relying parties that contains the certificates for all subordinate CAs. All certificates issued by this root CA and all certificate revocation lists (CRLs) relating thereto, shall be published in this repository. The repository for this root CA is provided as a web directory accessible via the HTTP protocol and is located at:

<http://www.echoworx.com/ca/root2/>

### ***4.9 Certificate revocation***

A certificate can be revoked for several reasons, including suspected or actual compromise of control of the private key that relates to the public key contained in the certificate, hardware or software failures that render the

private key inoperable, or failure of a subscriber to meet the obligations of this certificate policy and certification practices statement (CP/CPS) and/or related certificate policy (CP). Other circumstances for revocation may be stipulated in the particular CP and may relate to changes in a subscriber's relationship with the CA, such as a change in customer status.

Revocation may be requested by the subscriber (i.e., subordinate CA), registration authority (if applicable) or this root CA. Requests by RA personnel to revoke a certificate require sufficient RA system access rights. Requests by subscribers to revoke their own certificates require one of the following:

- A digitally signed message from the subscriber to the RA
- Personal presentation of the subscriber to the RA with a personal photo ID card
- Presentation of the pass phrase created by the subscriber at the point of initial application
- Other means as provided in the CP

A subscriber can request a certificate revocation via e-mail, or by telephone to the certification authority (see [Section 2.3 Contact information](#)). Certificate revocation requests made via e-mail or telephone are processed on a daily basis by the CA after the validity of such requests is ascertained. Validation procedures for telephone and e-mail revocation requests are defined in the CP. Validated certificate revocation requests will be processed no more than 48 hours after receipt. The CP may define a shorter time period for the processing of revocation requests.

Revocation requests for reasons other than key compromise must be placed within a maximum of 72 hours of the event necessitating revocation. In the case of suspected or known private key compromise, revocation request should be made immediately upon identification of the event.

This root CA's certificate revocation process supports the secure and authenticated revocation of one or more certificates of one or more entities and provides a means of rapid communication of such revocation through the issuance of CRLs published on an as-needed basis. The CA's system and processes provide the capability to revoke (1) the set of all certificates issued by the CA that have been signed with a single CA private signing key or (2) groups of certificates issued by the CA that have been signed with different CA private signing keys.

Upon revocation of the subscriber's certificate, the subscriber is notified via e-mail.

When a revocation request has been processed by an external registration authority, the external RA is also notified upon the revocation of a subscriber's certificate.

Upon the revocation of a subscriber's certificate, the newly revoked certificate is recorded in a CRL that is published within 24 hours.

## **4.10 Certificate suspension**

This root CA does not support suspension of (subordinate CA) public key certificates issued thereby.

## **4.11 Certificate status**

The CA publishes CRLs on an as-needed basis, as certificates are revoked. That is, the CRL is issued with a 'next issuance' date coincident with the expiry date of this root CA's certificate so, upon revocation of one or more subordinate CA certificates, an interim CRL shall be issued within 24 hours.

As stated in the CP, the onus for CRL checking is placed upon relying parties. This CA does not support online certificate status checking (OCSP).

A subscriber is notified of the revocation of his or her certificate by e-mail, postal mail, or telephone. The CP may define other forms of revocation advertisements.

The CA archives and retains all certificates and CRLs issued by the CA for a period not less than 10 years.

## ***4.12 Certificate profiles***

This section specifies the profiles of certificates that may be issued directly by this root CA, including its own self-signed certificate.

### 4.12.1 Root CA certificate profile

<b>Issuer (Root) CA Certificate Profile</b>		
<b>Basic Fields</b>		<b>Value</b>
<b>Version</b>		<b>0x2</b> ( <i>Version 3</i> )
<b>Serial Number</b>		<b>0</b> ( <i>Integer</i> )
<b>Signature Algorithm</b>		<b>SHA1withRSA-Encryption</b>
<b>Issuer</b>		DN: C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Echoworx Corporation, OU=Certification Services, CN=Echoworx Root CA2
<b>Validity</b>		<b>GeneralizedTime</b> ( <i>25 Years</i> ) <b>Not valid before:</b> <i>issue date - 1day</i> <b>Not valid after:</b> <i>issue date + 25yrs + 1day</i>
<b>Subject</b>		DN: C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Echoworx Corporation, OU=Certification Services, CN=Echoworx Root CA2
<b>Subject Public Key</b>		<b>subjectPublicKeyInfo</b>
<b>Issuer Unique ID</b>		<b>BitString</b>
<b>Subject Unique ID</b>		<b>BitString</b>
<b>X.509v3 Certificate Extensions</b>		
<b>Extended Attributes<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Critical</b>	<b>Value</b>
<b>Basic Constraints</b> <i>id-ce-basic-constraints</i>	Y	<b>True</b>
<b>Key Usage</b> <i>id-ce-keyUsage</i>	N	<b>keyCertificateSign</b> <b>cRLSign</b>
<b>Subject Key Identifier</b> <i>id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier</i>	N	<i>octetString (optional)</i>
<b>Authority Key Identifier</b> <i>id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier</i>	N	<i>octetString (optional)</i>
<b>Certificate Policy</b> <i>id-ce-certificatePolicy</i>	N	1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10.1.3.1
<b>Certification Practices Statement</b> <i>id-ce-certificatePolicies</i> + <i>id-qt-cps</i>	N	<a href="http://www.echoworx.com/ca/root2/cps.pdf">http://www.echoworx.com/ca/root2/cps.pdf</a>

<sup>1</sup> Refer to RFC-3280 for the definition and specific OID values for extended attributes.

## 4.12.2 Subordinate CA certificate profile

<b>Subject (Subordinate) CA Certificate Profile</b>		
<b>Basic Fields</b>	<b>Value</b>	
<b>Version</b>	<b>0x2</b> (Version 3)	
<b>Serial Number</b>	<b>UniqueIdentifier</b> (Integer)	
<b>Signature Algorithm</b>	<b>SHA2withRSA-Encryption</b>	
<b>Issuer</b>	DN: C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Echoworx Corporation, OU=Certification Services, CN=Echoworx Root CA2	
<b>Validity</b>	<b>GeneralizedTime</b> (10 Years) <b>Not valid before:</b> issue date - 1day <b>Not valid after:</b> issue date + 10yrs + 1day	
<b>Subject</b>	DN: C=CountryCode, ST=StateOrProvince, L=Locality, O=Organization, OU=OrganizationalUnit, CN=CommonName	
<b>Subject Public Key</b>	<b>subjectPublicKeyInfo</b>	
<b>Issuer Unique ID</b>	<b>BitString</b>	
<b>Subject Unique ID</b>	<b>BitString</b>	
<b>X.509v3 Certificate Extensions</b>		
<b>Extended Attributes</b>	<b>Critical</b>	<b>Value</b>
<b>Basic Constraints</b> id-ce-basic-constraints	Y	<b>True</b>
<b>Key Usage</b> id-ce-keyUsage	N	<b>keyCertificateSign</b> <b>cRLSign</b>
<b>Subject Key Identifier</b> id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier	N	<i>octetString (optional)</i>
<b>Authority Key Identifier</b> id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier	N	<i>octetString (optional)</i>
<b>NetScape Certificate Type</b> nsCertType	N	<b>Object Signing,</b> <b>Object Signing CA,</b> <b>SSL CA,</b> <b>S/MIME CA</b>
<b>CRL Distribution Points</b> id--ce-crlDistributionPoints	N	<a href="http://www.echoworx.com/ca/root2/crl.pem">http://www.echoworx.com/ca/root2/crl.pem</a>
<b>Certificate Policy</b> id-ce-certificatePolicy	N	1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10.1.4.c[.e] where: c (class) := 1 (A), 2 (B) or 3 (C) e (escrow) := 1 (escrowAllowed) if applicable
<b>Certification Practices Statement</b> id-ce-certificatePolicies + id-qt-cps	N	<a href="http://www.echoworx.com/ca/root2/cps.pdf">http://www.echoworx.com/ca/root2/cps.pdf</a> (optional; example URL only)

### 4.12.3 End-Entity certificate profiles

This root CA does not directly issue end-entity certificates.

## 4.13 CRL profile

<b>CRL Certificate Profile</b>	
<b>Basic Fields</b>	<b>Value</b>
<b>Version</b>	<b>0x1</b> ( <i>Version 2</i> )
<b>Serial Number</b>	<b>UniqueIdentifier</b> ( <i>Integer</i> )
<b>Signature Algorithm</b>	<b>SHA1withRSA-Encryption</b>
<b>Issuer</b>	DN: C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Echoworx Corporation, OU=Certification Services, CN=Echoworx Root CA2
<b>This update</b>	<b>GeneralizedTime</b> <i>time of CRL issuance</i>
<b>Next update</b>	<b>GeneralizedTime</b> <i>time of CA certificate expiry (not valid after date)</i>  <i>(i.e., no fixed publication schedule; only interim CRLs issued on an as-need basis)</i>
<b>List of Revoked Certificates</b>	
<i>Certificate identification information</i>	

## 4.14 Integrated circuit card (ICC) life cycle management

This root CA does not issue smart cards to subscribers. Subscribers may, at their own discretion, purchase smart cards and readers for purposes of key generation and storage.

## **5 CA environmental controls**

This section addresses the business and security controls for assuring integrity and trust in this root CA, including how this CP/CPS document is administered; cessation of operations; handling of sensitive and confidential information; intellectual property; physical security; business continuity; and event journaling.

### **5.1 CP & CPS administration**

Some revisions to this certificate policy and certification practices statement (CP/CPS) and or related certification policy (CP) documents may be deemed by the CA's policy authority to have minimal or no impact on subscribers and relying parties using certificates and CRLs issued by this root CA. Such revisions may be made without notice to users of the CP/CPS and without changing the version number of this CP/CPS. Revisions to the certificate policies supported by this CP/CPS, as well as revisions to the CP/CPS which are deemed by the CA's policy authority to have significant impact on the users of this CP/CPS, may be made with 30 days notice to the users and a change in version number for this CP/CPS.

This root CA's policy authority will provide notification of upcoming changes on the CA's website 30 days prior to significant revisions to this CPS.

This CP/CPS and any subsequent changes are approved by the CA's policy authority.

### **5.2 CA termination**

This root CA can only be terminated by the Echoworx board of directors. In the event this root CA is terminated, all subordinate CA certificates issued under the CA will be revoked and the CA will cease to issue certificates. The CA shall provide no less than 30 days notice to all business units utilizing the services of the CA. Upon termination, the records of the CA shall be archived and transferred to a designated custodian.

### **5.3 Confidentiality**

Information which is not considered by this root CA to be public domain information is to be kept confidential.

Confidential information includes:

- Subscribers' private signing keys are confidential and are not provided to the CA or RA.
- Information specific to the operation and control of the CA, such as security parameters and audit trails, is maintained confidentially by the CA and is not released outside of the CA organization unless required by law.
- Information about subscribers held by the CA or RAs, excluding that which is published in certificates, CRLs, certificate policies, or this CP/CPS, is considered confidential and shall not be released outside of the CA except as required by certificate policy or otherwise required by law.
- Generally, the results of annual audits are kept confidential, unless disclosure is deemed necessary by CA management.

Non-confidential information includes:

- Information included in certificates and CRLs issued by the CA is not considered confidential.
- Information in the certificate policies supported by this CA is not considered confidential.



- Information in the CA's disclosed CP/CPS is not considered confidential.
- When the CA revokes a certificate, a revocation reason is included in the CRL entry for the revoked certificate. This revocation reason code is not considered confidential and can be shared with all other subscribers and relying parties. However, no other details concerning the revocation are normally disclosed.

The CA shall comply with legal requirements to release information to law enforcement officials. The CA may disclose to another party information pertaining to the owner of such information upon the owner's request.

## ***5.4 Intellectual property rights***

Public key certificates and CRLs issued by the CA are the property of Echoworx. This CP/CPS document is the property of Echoworx.

## ***5.5 Security management***

A current information security policy exists, which is approved and endorsed by senior management. It is published as corporate document and is communicated to the appropriate staff groups via security awareness program.

The policy defines the objectives, scope, intent and principals of information security and measures to ensure compliance with security standards and regulatory requirements.

In particular, the security policy contains an approach to address and meet requirements of the following areas of information security:

- compliance with regulatory, legislative and contractual requirements
- guidance for security training requirements of staff
- computer security to reduce weaknesses and exposures and for example to prevent software viruses or malicious software
- business continuity and responsibility of management and staff
- compliance enforcement and consequences of policy violations.

Information security is managed to establish sustainable compliance with business objectives and with requirements. This includes direction, governance and review and authorization process.

Management of security addresses also:

- procedures to sustain physical and logical security in CA facilities and systems despite third-party access
- risk assessments to identify security implications and security control requirements
- the addressing of security requirements and responsibilities with contracts between parties or in cases of delegation of CA roles and responsibilities.

## ***5.6 Asset classification and management***

Owners are assigned to major CA assets with responsibility to establish and maintain appropriate controls.

Inventories are maintained for important CA assets.

Information classification is implemented reflecting business and information protection needs and provides guidance for labeling and handling to enable compliance with the classification scheme.

## **5.7 Personnel security**

Security roles and responsibilities, as specified in the organization's security policy, are documented in job descriptions.

Verification checks on key permanent and contract staff are performed at the time of job application. The CA's policies and procedures specify the background checks and clearance procedures required for the personnel filling the trusted roles, and other personnel, including janitorial staff.

Employees sign a confidentiality (nondisclosure) agreement as part of their initial terms and conditions of employment.

Contracted personnel controls include the following:

- Bonding requirements on contract personnel
- Contractual requirements including indemnification for damages due to the actions of the contractor personnel
- Audit and monitoring of contractor personnel

Employee and contracted staff receive appropriate training to raise awareness and achieve compliance with corporate security policies. This training is aligned with clear role based compliance and training requirements.

A formal disciplinary process exists and is followed for employees who have violated organizational security policies and procedures. The CA's policies and procedures specify the sanctions against personnel for unauthorized actions, unauthorized use of authority, and unauthorized use of systems.

Appropriate and timely actions are taken when an employee is terminated so that controls and security are not impaired by such an occurrence.

## **5.8 Physical security controls**

All critical CA operations take place within a physically secure facility with at least four layers of security to access sensitive hardware or software. Sensitive system components are physically separated from the organization's other systems so that only authorized employees of the CA can access them.

Physical access to the CA system is strictly controlled and is subject to continuous (24/7) electronic surveillance monitoring. Only trustworthy individuals with a valid business reason are provided such access. The access control system is always functional and electronic badge readers in addition to conventional combination locks.

All CA systems have industry standard power and air conditioning systems to provide a suitable operating environment.

All CA systems have reasonable precautions taken to minimize the impact of water exposure.

All CA systems have industry standard fire prevention and protection mechanisms in place.

Media storage under the control of the CA is subject to the normal media storage requirements of the company.

Waste is disposed of in accordance with the organization's normal waste disposal requirements. Cryptographic devices are physically destroyed or zeroized in accordance with the manufacturers' guidance prior to disposal.

Off-site backups are stored in a physically secure manner by a bonded third-party storage facility.

## **5.9 Business continuity management controls**

The CA has a business continuity and disaster recovery plan to restore the CA's business operations in a reasonably timely manner following interruption to, or failure of, critical business processes. The CA's business continuity plan defines 72 hours as an acceptable system outage time in the event of a major natural disaster or CA private key compromise.

Copies of essential business information and CA system software are performed whenever there is a change made to this root CA's off-line system.

The CA maintains a recovery site, which is approximately 15 km apart from the CA's primary site.

Effectiveness of business and disaster recovery plans are tested at least once a year with appropriate methods.

Controls are in place to detect a compromised CA private signing key or a suspected compromise. Its occurrence is considered a disaster and appropriate measures are taken as defined in the disaster recovery plan.

## **5.10 Event logging**

As part of this root CA's system backup procedures, audit trail files are backed up to media prior to shutdown of intermittent operation of the off-line root CA system and thereafter archived by the system administrator.

Event journals are reviewed at least on a monthly basis by CA management. The review must be documented including findings, notifications to senior management, actions taken and issue resolution

The logged events must be inspected to identify incidents with high severity and to eliminate "false positives". Events that are considered "high severity" could cause a risk for system availability or represent a security breach or an attempted breach, such as multiple incorrect logons of a user account, attempts of unauthorized access to systems and resources and unauthorized alterations of critical and security related system parameters.

The event logs of Hardware Security Modules are monitored with on-line monitoring software in short time intervals. Detected events are rated and significant events will trigger an e-mail notification sent to alert the CA operations team. The CA operations team reviews the situation in real-time, and performs the necessary steps to notify about and to resolve the problem. Access to the logs is secure and available only to the CA operations team.

## 6 References

[RFC3280]

Housley, R. et al., *Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile*, Network Working Group Request for Comments: 3280, The Internet Society, April 2002.  
<http://www.rfc-archive.org/getrfc.php?rfc=3280>

[WebTrust]

*AICPA/CICA WebTrust<sup>SM/TM</sup> Program for Certification Authorities, version 1.0*, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc. and *Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants*, 2000/08/25,  
[http://www.webtrust.org/index.cfm/ci\\_id/44018/la\\_id/1.htm](http://www.webtrust.org/index.cfm/ci_id/44018/la_id/1.htm)

## 7 Appendix A: Root CA2 Certificate

Echoworx Root CA2 Certificate	
MD5 Fingerprint	A9:81:C0:B7:3A:92:50:BC:91:A5:21:FF:3D:47:87:9F
SHA1 Fingerprint	CB:65:82:64:EA:8C:DA:18:6E:17:52:FB:52:C3:97:36:7E:A3:87:BE
PEM Form	<pre>-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIE5zCCA8+gAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCBjTElMAkGA1UEBhMCQ0Ex EDA0BGNVBAgTB09udGFyaW8xEDA0BGNVBAcTB1Rvcn9udG8xHTAbBgNVBAoTFEVj aG93b3J4IENvcnBvcnF0aW9uMR8wHQYDVQQLZXZDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIFNlcnZp Y2VzMR0wGAYDVQQDExFFY2hvd29yeCBSb290IENBMjAeFw0wNTEwMDYxMDQ5MTNa Fw0zMDUwMDUxMDQ5MTNaMIGNMQswCQYDVQQLGEwJkQTEQMA4GA1UECBMHT250YXJp bzEQMA4GA1UEBxMHVG9yb250bzEdMBSGA1UEChMURWVhbnNob3dvcnggQ29ycG9yYXRp b24xHzAdBgNVBAsTFkNlcnRpb24xYXRpb24xYXRpb24xYXRpb24xYXRpb24xYXRpb24x aG93b3J4IFJvb3QgQ0EYMIIBIDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ0AMIIBCACCAQEA utU/5BkV15UBf+s+JQruKQxr77s3rjp/RpOtmhHILiO5gsEWP8MMrfrVEiidjI6 Qh6ans0KAWc2Dw0/j4qKAQzOSyAZgicdypNTBZ7muv212DA2Pu41rXqwMrlBrVi/ KTghfdLlNRu6JrC5y8HarrRFSKF1Thbzz921kLDRoCi+FVs5eVuK5LvIfkhNAqA byrTgO3T9zfZgk8upmEkANPDL1+8y7dGPB/d6lk0I5mv8PESKX02TlvwRSlIiTHR k8++iOPLBWIgP7ZfqTEXkPUZhrQQvxcrwCUo6mk8TqgxCDP5FgPoHFiPLef5szP ZLBJDWP7GLyE1PmkQI6WiWIBA6OCAVAwggFMMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wCwYD VR0PBAQDAgEGMB0GA1UdDgQWBQBQ74YEboKs/OyGC1eISrq5QqxSIEzCBugYDVR0j BIGyMIGvgBQ74YEboKs/OyGC1eISrq5QqxSIE6GBk6SBkDCBjTElMAkGA1UEBhMC Q0ExEDA0BGNVBAgTB09udGFyaW8xEDA0BGNVBAcTB1Rvcn9udG8xHTAbBgNVBAoT FEVjaG93b3J4IENvcnBvcnF0aW9uMR8wHQYDVQQLZXZDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIFNl cnZpY2VzMR0wGAYDVQQDExFFY2hvd29yeCBSb290IENBMoIBADBQBGNVHSAESTBH MEUGCysGAQQB+REKAQMBMDYwNAIYKwYBBQUHAgEwKgh0dHA6Ly93d3cuZWVhbnNob3dvcnZp cngUy29tL2NhL3Jvb3QyL2Nwcy5wZG9yYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAG+nrPi/ 0RpfEzrj02C6JGpUar4nbjIhcY6N7DWNeqBoUulBSIH/PYGNHYx7/lnJefiixPGE 7TQ5xPgElxb9bK8zoAapO7U33OubqZ7M7DIHnFeCoOoIAZnG1kuwKwD5CXKB2a74 HzcqNnFW0IsBFCYqrVh/rQgJOzDA8POGbh0DeD0xjwBBooAolkKT+7ZiJf1Pb56 QpDL9G+16F7GkmnKlAIYt3QTS3yFGYChnJcd+6txUPhKi9sSOOmAlaKHnkH9Scz+ A2cSi4A3wUYXVatuVNhpRb2lygfH3SuCX9MU8Ure3zBISU1LAltMq14JmcQmQpIq zIzvO2jHyu9PQqo= -----END CERTIFICATE-----</pre>
Text Form	<pre>Certificate:   Data:     Version: 3 (0x2)     Serial Number: 0 (0x0)     Signature Algorithm: sha1withRSAEncryption     Issuer: C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Echoworx     Corporation, OU=Certification Services, CN=Echoworx Root CA2     Validity       Not Before: Oct 6 10:49:13 2005 GMT       Not After : Oct 7 10:49:13 2030 GMT     Subject: C=CA, ST=Ontario, L=Toronto, O=Echoworx     Corporation, OU=Certification Services, CN=Echoworx Root CA2     Subject Public Key Info:       Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption       RSA Public key: (2048 bit)       Modulus (2048 bit):         00:ba:d5:3f:e4:19:15:d7:95:01:7f:eb:3e:25:0a:</pre>

ee:29:0c:6b:ef:bb:37:ae:3a:7f:46:93:ad:9a:11:  
c8:2c:88:8e:e6:0b:04:58:ff:0c:32:b7:eb:54:48:  
a2:76:32:3a:42:1e:9a:9e:cd:0a:01:67:36:0f:0d:  
3f:8f:8a:8a:01:0c:ce:4b:20:19:82:37:1d:ca:93:  
53:05:9e:e6:ba:fd:b5:d8:30:36:3e:ee:35:ad:7a:  
b0:32:b9:41:ad:58:bf:29:38:21:7d:d2:e5:35:1b:  
ba:26:b0:b9:cb:c1:da:ae:b9:d1:15:22:85:d5:38:  
5b:cf:3f:76:d6:42:c3:46:80:a2:f8:55:6c:e5:e5:  
6e:2b:92:ef:21:f9:21:34:0a:80:6f:2a:d3:80:ed:  
d3:f7:37:d9:82:4f:2e:a6:61:24:00:d3:c3:2f:5f:  
bc:cb:b7:46:3c:1f:dd:ea:59:34:23:99:af:f0:f1:  
12:29:7d:36:4e:5b:f0:81:14:88:89:31:d1:93:cf:  
be:88:e3:cb:05:69:46:a7:b6:5f:a9:31:17:90:f5:  
19:86:0a:d0:42:fc:5c:af:00:94:a3:a9:a4:f1:3a:  
a0:c4:20:cf:e4:58:0f:a0:71:62:3c:b7:9f:e6:cc:  
cf:64:b0:49:0d:6a:7b:18:bc:84:d4:f9:a4:40:8e:  
96:8b

Exponent: 3 (0x3)

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical

CA:TRUE

X509v3 Key Usage:

Certificate Sign, CRL Sign

X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:

3B:E1:81:1B:A0:AB:3F:3B:21:82:D5:E2:12:AE:AE:50:AB:14:A5:13

X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

keyid:3B:E1:81:1B:A0:AB:3F:3B:21:82:D5:E2:12:AE:AE:50:AB:14:A5:13

DirName:/C=CA/ST=Ontario/L=Toronto/O=Echoworx  
Corporation/OU=Certification Services/CN=Echoworx Root CA2  
serial:00

X509v3 Certificate Policies:

Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.15505.10.1.3.1

CPS: <http://www.echoworx.com/ca/root2/cps.pdf>

Signature Algorithm: sha1withRSAEncryption

6f:a7:ac:f8:bf:d1:1a:5f:13:3a:e3:d3:60:ba:24:63:d4:6a:  
be:27:6e:32:21:71:8e:8d:ec:35:8d:7a:a0:68:52:e9:41:48:  
81:ff:3d:81:8d:1d:8c:7b:fe:59:c9:79:f8:a2:c4:f1:84:ed:  
34:39:c4:f8:04:97:16:fd:6c:af:33:a0:00:29:3b:b5:37:dc:  
eb:9b:a9:9e:cc:ec:39:47:9c:57:82:a0:ea:08:01:99:c6:d6:  
4b:b0:2b:00:f9:09:72:81:d9:ae:f8:1f:37:2a:36:71:56:d0:  
8b:01:14:26:2a:ad:58:7f:ad:08:09:3b:30:c0:f0:f3:86:6c:  
7d:03:78:3d:31:8f:00:41:a2:80:28:96:42:93:fb:b6:48:b4:  
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bb:4c:a8:8e:09:99:c4:26:42:92:2a:cc:8c:ef:3b:68:c7:ca:  
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